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Article 
 
Yes to Realism! No to Non-naturalism! 
 
Ulysses T. Araña 
 
 
ccording to contemporary moral realism a moral property, like goodness or 
badness, is either a natural (descriptive) property or a non-natural (non-
descriptive) property of actions or situations.  Contemporary moral 
naturalists like Richard Boyd, Nicholas Sturgeon, and David Brink are a group 
of philosophers who are often referred to as Cornell realists because of their 
connection with Cornell University.1  Frank Jackson is another contemporary 
moral naturalist who is one of the leaders of The Canberra Planners2 at the 
Australian National University with which he is connected.  Jackson defends 
“the most extreme form of naturalism.”3 Jackson’s view is considered extreme 
by those who disagree with him because he believes that moral properties are 
reducible or identical to natural properties.  This view of Jackson is opposed by 
contemporary non-naturalists like Jonathan Dancy, Derek Parfit, and Russ 
Shafer-Landau for reasons which in my view are not successful.  Despite 
Jackson’s reductionism about the ethical, the Cornell realists, nevertheless, 
agree with him that moral properties are natural properties. 
Supervenience is a logical platitude that is shared and used commonly by 
moral naturalists and moral non-naturalists to explain the nature of moral 
properties.  Supervenience is the logical truism (i) that moral properties are 
dependent for their realization and emergence on natural properties: “an act’s 
non-moral properties do determine without remainder an act’s being right”4, 
and (ii) that actions and situations which are exactly alike in their non-moral or 
descriptive properties cannot differ in their moral properties: “two actions that 
share all their non-moral properties to the same degree must share all their 
moral properties to the same degree, and that no object can change its moral 
properties without changing its non-moral properties.”5 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the metaphysical plausibility 
of the non-naturalist view of moral properties.  I will mainly concentrate my 
evaluation on the views of Shafer-Landau (henceforth just S-L) whose defence 
                                                 
1 Alexander Miller, An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics (Cambridge UK: Polity 
Press, 2003), 1-9. 
2 Hans-Johann Glock, What is Analytic Philosophy? (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 116. 
3 Jonathan Dancy, “Nonnaturalism”, in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, ed.  by 
David Copp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 122-145. 
4 Frank Jacson, “What Are Cognitivists Doing When They Do Normative Ethics?,” in 
Philosophical Issues, 15 (2005), 98. 
5 Jonathan Dancy, “On Moral Properties”, in Mind, 90 (Jul 1981), 374-375. 
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of moral non-naturalism is the most lucid and vigorous so far.  I shall try to 
show its metaphysical problems and defend Jackson’s Occamist naturalism 
about moral properties which I consider to be more consistent with the 
supervenience platitude. 
 
Moral Non-naturalism 
 
In his book, Moral Realism: A Defence, S-L lucidly and vigorously 
defends a non-naturalist metaphysical view of morality in the tradition of 
Moore.  Like the Cornell realists, S-L advances a non-reductive explanation of 
the existence and nature of moral properties like goodness and badness.  But 
unlike the Cornell realists who think that moral properties are natural 
(descriptive) and knowable a posteriori, S-L believes that they are sui generis, non-
natural, and knowable a priori.  Moral properties necessarily supervene on 
descriptive properties.  To S-L moral properties can be constituted by 
descriptive properties but cannot be identical to them.  Thus, moral properties 
cannot be reduced to descriptive properties.   
S-L’s moral metaphysics is like certain nonreductive views in the 
philosophy of mind.  Although he does think that moral properties supervene 
on descriptive properties, he denies that moral property types are identical to 
descriptive property types.  I will argue, however, that S-L’s dependence on the 
metaphysical notion of supervenience casts some doubts on the integrity of his 
adherence to non-naturalism because the supervenience platitude is a no 
gratuitous extra view of moral properties.  His metaphysical view of moral 
properties can be taken as a moral naturalist view for some basic reasons 
without losing anything that is explanatorily significant. 
As a metaphysical realist view of moral properties moral non-
naturalism has been with us since Plato.  But it was G.  E.  Moore who gave us 
its modern articulation in his Principia Ethica.  Briefly, Moore asserts that an 
ethical property term is not synonymous with a natural property term.  Hence, 
if M stands for a moral property and N for a natural property, it is not analytic 
but synthetic that 
 
(1) M = N. 
 
If property terms M and N have the same meaning or are 
synonymous, then they can be taken to apply interchangeably to the same 
property or set of properties of which they are true.  Otherwise, they do not.  
Ethical naturalists would say that they do apply to the same property or set of 
properties, while Moore and his followers would say otherwise.6 (1)’s being 
synthetic and non-synonymous is the reason why it is an open question 
whether a natural property is a moral property.  If Moore denies that ethical 
properties are identical to natural properties, not only is (1) not analytic, it is 
                                                 
6 G.  E.  Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 89-
110.  
 
 
170     YES TO REALISM! 
false.  But I take it that all Moore is saying is that statements of the form (1) are 
synthetic, leaving open whether they are true or false.  Moore took his Open 
Question Argument to show that ethical and natural properties are not 
identical.  But all it really shows is that moral and natural terms are not 
synonymous.7 S-L claims that 
 
(2) moral properties are sui generis, and not identical to any 
natural properties.8 
 
Consistent with Mooreanism, (2) is not necessarily incompatible with 
Cornell realism because it also insists on the non-identity of moral and non-
moral terms, but would nevertheless maintain that moral properties are natural 
properties because of the distinction that Cornell realists make between 
properties and concepts.9 With (2), S-L denies naturalism for he believes that moral 
properties are non-natural properties.  This is the difference between him and 
the Cornell realists.10 He could be taken to claim something like 
 
(3) M = Nn. 
 
in which a moral property M is metaphysically and conceptually identical to a 
non-natural property Nn.  This makes sense because if he believes that M is 
not a natural property, then he believes that M has a property of being non-
natural which is Nn.  This could be a possible interpretation of what he means 
when he characterizes his moral metaphysics as “a non-naturalistic view of 
moral properties.”11  
I  will take “natural” and “non-natural” as diametric characterizations 
of two distinct properties here because (a) it is not clear (and I have no idea) 
what make(s) a non-natural property non-natural, (b) to say that a moral 
property is non-natural (period) seems to beg the question against moral 
naturalists that the moral is non-natural, (c) to say that what really makes a 
moral property non-natural is essentially its being normative12 is controversial 
since normativity can also be accommodated by naturalists,13 and (d) to say that 
what a non-naturalist really means by a “non-natural” property is simply that it 
is “not-natural” does not explain anything because it is a circular definition.  
(a), (b), (c), and (d) are also the reasons why base property P is needed to make 
sense of the supervenience relation between M and Nn. 
 
                                                 
7 This has been pointed out to me by Mark Timmons. 
8 Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 66. 
9 Nicholas Sturgeon, “Moral Explanations,” in Morality, Reason, and Truth, ed.  by David 
Copp and David Zimmerman (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1984), 59. 
10 Shafer-Landau, op cit., 64 
11 Ibid., 115 
12 Dancy, “Nonnaturalism,” 133-136. 
13 David Copp, “Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity,” in Normativity 
and Naturalism, ed. by Peter Schaber (Frankfurt: Ontos-Verlag, 2004), 7-45.  
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Some Problems about S-L’s Moral Non-naturalism 
 
I can think of two (there maybe more) ways by which we can grasp S-
L’s attitude towards (1) and (3).  First, he can be taken to hold that whereas (1) 
is synthetic, (3) is analytic.  So it appears that Moore’s open question argument 
applies to (1) but does not apply to (3).  But I don’t think so.  I think that like 
(1), (3) is also susceptible to the open question argument.  We can always 
sensibly doubt whether a moral non-natural property (whatever that is) is good.  
But I think that he is clever enough to see this.  So I doubt if he would agree to 
be taken like this.  But if he would have no complaint about being taken this 
way, it would appear that S-L is a reductivist of a different sort after all for he 
could be taken to reduce the moral to the non-natural.  And even if this is what 
he is saying, the burden of explaining what makes a non-natural property non-
natural, and why a moral property should be reduced to it, is on him and not 
on anyone like myself who has no idea what would that mean. 
The second way to take him is by saying that on his view (1) is 
susceptible to the open question argument but (3) is not for he does not hold 
that (3) expresses analyticity or interdefinability.  As already noted earlier, for 
this to make sense we would have to motivate or invoke subvenient property P 
that could serve as a base property upon which M and Nn would depend for 
their realization, for neither M nor Nn could serve as a base property for each 
other.  What needs an explanation cannot be itself the explanation.  But is it 
not possible for (3) to express a supervenience relation between M and Nn? 
That is, could M supervene on Nn? Even the converse is possible,14 but I 
doubt whether S-L would allow it since on his view M would only supervene 
on P.   
There was no mention of the possibility of M supervening on Nn in 
his work.  In any case, it is left to the one who will countenance a 
supervenience relation between M and Nn to explain how it is possible.  To 
some philosophers it is already obscure why the moral should supervene on the 
natural.15 They would surely consider the supervenience relation between M 
and N to be more obscure than between M and P.  So (3)’s being 
metaphysically and conceptually necessary would be by virtue of something like 
Leibniz’s law of indiscernibles or the covariance principle of supervenience.  By 
this law or principle, M and Nn would be identical if, for any property P, M has 
P if and only if Nn has P.  In other words, properties M and Nn are identical 
only by virtue of another property P that realizes them necessarily in all 
possible worlds.  But (3) alone does not show this.  So a revised version of (3) 
would be needed, and it will be like 
 
                                                 
14 Jaegwon Kim, “Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept,” in Metaphysics: An 
Anthology, edited by Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 540-
556.   
15 See Stephen Schiffer, Remnants of Meaning (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), 153-
154.  
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(4) M = Nn, if and only if necessarily M has P and Nn has 
P. 
 
But what is this P that makes supervenient properties M and Nn 
identical? To avoid double counting, a naturalist would say that P is a natural 
property, depending of course on whether she is a reductivist or a non-
reductivist about the ethical.  S-L who is also a non-reductivist about the 
ethical would go with the latter.  But unlike the non-reductive naturalist, he will 
not consider M a natural property.  What about Nn? If (4) is true, then Nn will 
turn out to be a natural (or another distinct) property, which is inconsistent 
since it is non-natural.  Surely Nn is not supervenient on P on this 
interpretation.  Why would a non-natural property be natural? Naturally, 
naturalists would reject this view because it is utterly obscure and inconsistent.  
Besides, naturalists can be satisfied with the identity of moral and natural 
properties expressed by (1).  It is this kind of obscurity and inconsistency 
which I would like to be noticed here because it will cast doubt on S-L’s (and 
that of another moral philosopher’s) non-naturalism.  A moral non-naturalist 
also owes us an explanation as to why M, being supervenient on P, would also 
be identical to a sui generis Nn which is not supervenient on P. 
These interpretations however can easily be dismissed on the ground 
that the predicative claim in (3) simply predicates the higher-order property of 
non-naturalness, (an extra property) to a moral property and not that a moral 
property type is identical to a non-natural property type.  S-L need not accept 
(3) since it expresses the is of identity rather than the is of predication.  But I 
think that such interpretations are possible and not entirely confused and 
mistaken.  They will not go away because what makes a non-natural property 
non-natural is not clear.  What is the explanatory advantage of predicating a 
higher-order property of non-naturalness to a moral property? What is the 
causal explanatory power or advantage of a non-natural property if it is not 
identical to a natural property? We will see later that it has none at all. 
In a number of passages on the supervenience relation between the 
moral and the non-moral (natural) properties, S-L appears to be tilting towards 
naturalism, which makes me wonder why he considers his view non-naturalist.  
Consider the following passages: 
 
(5) moral properties will be realized exclusively by 
instantiations of descriptive properties, though moral and 
descriptive properties are non-identical.  Non-naturalists 
(and non-reductive ethical naturalists) will cite this 
relation as the basis for explaining the supervenience of 
the moral on the descriptive.  Covariance is explained by 
means of constitution: something possesses the moral 
status it does in virtue of its descriptive constituents.    
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These latter [the descriptive constituents] exhaustively 
constitute the former.16 
 
(6) necessarily, if property M is instantiated, so too is 
property N, and, necessarily, if N is instantiated, so too is 
M.  Non-naturalists can accept the necessary 
coextensiveness of moral and descriptive properties, on 
the assumption that properties can be necessarily 
coextensive without being identical.  I think that this 
assumption is true.17 
 
A number of important things can be said about (5) and (6).  The first 
one is that S-L’s refusal to identify moral properties with descriptive properties, 
despite the a priori dependence of the moral on the natural, is due to his claim 
that the property of necessary coextension is distinct from the property of identity.18 
But even if this conceptual distinction succeeds, still, it is not clear why his 
commitment to the necessary coextension between the natural and the moral 
will not count as naturalism even if coextension does not entail identity.   
Moreover, moral properties and natural properties might still be identical even 
if the moral property terms and natural property terms that pick them out are 
not synonymous.  It is already known that two terms can be coextensional or 
coreferential without being synonymous. 
The second one that can be said is that invoking coextensive relation 
between the moral and the natural can be a strong supervenience argument for 
reductive naturalists like Jackson with whom S-L disagrees.  Now, (5) and (6) 
are non-reductive naturalistic supervenience claims which he accepts “in all 
essentials.”19 In fact, according to him the only difference between him and the 
non-reductive naturalists is “whether or not one is willing to count moral 
properties as natural ones.”20 This to me is quite jarring and confusing.  Why is 
he not willing to accept them as natural? I guess the answer is because he 
thinks that ethics is not a science.  Since, in his view, ethical properties are not 
among the natural properties which are properly studied by science, ethical 
properties are not natural.   
But this is misleading since ethics might still be natural even if it is not 
a science.21 His non-reductive supervenience claim is no different from that of 
the non-reductive naturalists.  His conceptual distinction between coextension 
and identity might even be acceptable to them.  I cannot help but be mystified 
and confused as to why he would refuse to accept that moral properties are 
natural even in the weak sense (i.e., in the non-reductive sense).  How strong or 
                                                 
16 Shafer-Landau, op cit., 86.  Italics mine. 
17 Ibid., 90-91. 
18 Ibid., 91. 
19 Shafer-Landau, op cit., 64. 
20 Ibid., 64 
21 See Copp, op cit., 7-45.  
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weak really is his notion of the dependence of the moral on the natural in the 
light of (5) and (6)? 
 
Moral Naturalism 
 
Analytic naturalists like Jackson22 and Peter Railton23 claim that (1) 
signifies analytic equivalence or sameness of meaning between M and N.   
According to analytic naturalism M and N are identical because they share the 
same extension.  On this view, the extension of M and N is the set of particular 
descriptive properties d1, or d2, or d3, and so on, which can only be 
individuated empirically, and which also serve as multiple realizers of M and N.  
There can be no M and N without extension.  Jackson claims that membership 
of this set is “possibly infinitely disjunctive descriptive properties.”24 This is 
moral functionalism, which is “the view that to be right is to have the property 
that fills the rightness role, and so mutatis mutandis for all the moral properties.  
The analogy is with functionalism in the philosophy of mind, where to be in 
pain, say, is to be in the state that plays the pain role.”25 The essential 
metaphysical claim (a platitude in my view) of analytic naturalism is: 
 
(7) there is no ethical nature over and above descriptive 
nature.26  
 
This means (a) that there can be no ethical nature without descriptive 
nature, (b) that a difference in what is ethical is entailed by a difference in what 
is descriptive or natural, and (c) that no difference in the ethical feature of an 
action or event without difference in its descriptive or natural feature(s).  This 
is perfectly consistent with (i) and (ii).  This Occamist view of moral properties 
has the conceptual advantage of not making a double count of relevant moral 
making properties.  That is, the moral making properties themselves are natural 
and not non-natural due to the supervenience platitude. 
S-L’s moral non-naturalism is an extra property view of moral 
properties which is anti-Occamist and is guilty of double counting.  He also 
admits that moral facts might lack causal powers.  He boldly acknowledges that 
his “preferred story,” is “one that involves property dualism and the claim that 
moral facts are invariably constituted by sets of descriptive facts,” and that 
“this lack of independent causal power should be entirely unsurprising.”27 But 
this view of his is incompatible with the total dependence of moral properties 
on non-moral properties.  Jackson believes correctly in my view that 
“supervenience tells us that an act’s non-moral properties do determine without 
                                                 
22 Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 144-146. 
23 Peter Railton, “Reply to David Wiggins,” in Reality, Representation, and Projection, ed.  
by John Haldane and Crispin Wright (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 315-328. 
24 Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics, 124. 
25 Jackson, “What Are Cognitivists Doing When They Do Normative Ethics?”, 104. 
26 Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics, 146. 
27 Shafer-Landau, op cit., 111.  
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remainder an act’s being right.  Nothing more needs to obtain.”28 S-L’s extra 
property is an epiphenomenal one.  This obscure property does not play any 
causal explanatory role whatsoever.  Only a few people will have the stomach 
to swallow it in contemporary metaethics. 
Moral realists believe correctly that moral properties like goodness and 
badness play some causal explanatory role in the world.  This fact is perfectly 
acknowledged by S-L himself.29 A politician’s generosity can causally explain 
why he has been elected the last election.  A scientist’s discovery of penicillin 
causally explains why he has been given the Nobel Prize for medicine.  His 
having committed murder causally explains why he is in jail.  His having 
received bribe money causally explains why the former President has been 
ousted by a peaceful revolution.  You will notice that in each of these examples 
an extra non-descriptive property does not play any causal explanatory role at 
all.  In fact, it is not even needed to explain anything in these examples and 
nothing is significantly lost if we do away with it.  What now is the causal and 
explanatory relevance of an extra property view that S-L endorses? None at all 
in my view.  The non-moral properties alone can independently explain the 
causal role and efficacy of moral facts and properties simply because they are 
natural facts and properties. 
In my view, S-L’s supervenience claim is better understood as a 
naturalist one since, as in mind-body supervenience, it does not allow for a free 
floating moral/mental world unconstrained by the physical world as implied by 
both (5), (6), and (7).  It is not also clear what makes his supervenience claim 
different from that of non-reductive naturalists.  (5) and (6) are not even 
necessarily opposed to or inconsistent with naturalism.  If (5) and (6) are not 
necessarily inconsistent with naturalism, then his metaphysics about the ethical 
can be considered a naturalist one, similar to the non-reductionism of the 
Cornell realists.  There must be a good reason for his unwillingness to count 
moral properties as natural ones.  What that reason is has not been clearly 
argued. 
Like S-L, I also consider Moore’s challenge to be relevant because it 
inspires contemporary ethical naturalists to explain, with all the philosophical 
wits they could muster, why a moral property and a natural property can be 
identical.  But unlike Moore, S-L, and other non-naturalists, I am not 
bamboozled by the naturalistic fallacy because I consider moral naturalism to 
be the only palatable view that can explain the supervenience of moral 
properties on natural properties.  Analytic moral naturalism is Occamist and 
avoids double counting.  This virtue is a good reason why analytic naturalism is 
a more preferable position in contemporary metaethics. 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 Jackson, “What Are Cognitivists Doing When They Do Normative Ethics?,” 98.  
Italics mine. 
29 Shafer-Landau, op cit., 100.  
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Conclusion 
 
With the above discussion, we could conclude that Shafer-Landau 
appears more to be a naturalist than a non-naturalist.  It is puzzling why he 
keeps himself from being the former.  I understand that the difference might 
be just epistemological as he intimated himself.30 He thinks that moral truths 
can be known a priori, and naturalists think that they are known a posteriori.  
Now if the difference is simply epistemological, then he and the naturalists are 
in the same metaphysical boat.  His realism about ethics is no less naturalistic 
than that of the naturalists.  There is, therefore, nothing significant about S-L’s 
extra property view.  It is obvious that his non-naturalist view of moral 
properties has no causal explanatory advantage and has no important role to 
play in explaining the nature of moral properties.  The extra property he 
invokes is an epiphenomenal property and is explanatorily impotent.  Nothing 
is significantly lost if we take his metaphysics a naturalist one.  Analytic 
naturalism or moral functionalism has the conceptual virtue and advantage of 
being parsimonious because it avoids double counting.* 
 
Department of Philosophy, University of the Philippines-Diliman, Philippines 
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